The Cabal of Life Support:  Group G

When drawn, Group G was proclaimed by many to be the Group of Death.  

Clearly, I disagree, but the difference between that conclusion and my opinion comes down to your definition of Group of Death.  Do you define it as the toughest group (one-to-four), or the group that's the most difficult from which to advance?

If you pick difficulty of advancement, then you look at the strength of the second and third best teams, completely ignoring the worst (non-factor) team.  You also completely disagree with me picking another quartet as the Group of Death, as Group G will see one of Brazil , Portugal or Cote d'Ivoire go home after three matches.

Even accepting that premise, there are two problems when trying to label Brazil's group as the tournament's toughest.

First, there are large disparities at the top and bottom of the group.  This has been widely discussed in terms of North Korea, one of the worst teams in the tournament, but is also germane to Brazil, who is significantly better the group's other sides. 

The second problem in calling G the Group of Death:  it has been a while since the Portuguese played like an elite team.  Much of the Group G/Group of Death dialog is based around the Golden Generation's legacy and the name value of Cristiano Ronaldo. 

Portugal's results, however, have been unconvincing.  If they are not as good as some of the metrics suggest, there little difference between them and Ghana (Group D), Chile (Group G) or Cameroon (Group E).  In some  interpretations, they would be the worst of that foursome.

Regardless, this group is one of the toughest - if not most entertaining - in next summer's draw.  To break it down, World Soccer Digest continues its review of the 2010 World Cup groups with The Cabal of Life Support:  Group G.

Elo - Elo Rating; FIFA - FIFA World Ranking, December 2009; SPI - Soccer Power Index, Silver/Soccernet; SPA - Set Piece Analysts World Cup Power Poll; Avg. - Statistical mean of four measures

By the metrics, this is the most difficult group out of which to advance, with two nations in the second-level range (9-16) in the same group as the tournament's best team.  Only the FIFA rating fails to label Brazil as the world's best, preferring to give that title to the Spaniards.

What is particularly interesting about Portugal and Cote d'Iviore's ratings are the ranges.  Portugal goes from five (on the high end) to fourteen, a curious difference until you notice Cote d'Iviore's range stretches from five to twenty-two.

With those ranges, you see room for many different opinions about Group G.  If you buy into Portugal and Cote d'Ivoire's high-end evaluations, this is not only the toughest group in South Africa, it may be the toughest group of all time.  People who believe those count more to the middle (or lower) if their ratings will think this merely a very good group.

And that's where the analysis comes in.

Brazil - The Selecão has become an analyst's dream:  high-profile, predictable set-up and selection, incontrovertible results.  They almost write their own review.

After a (relatively) slow start to CONMEBOL qualification, Brazil easily won the South American region, using stout defending to grind-out results until Dunga's attack asserted itself.  Then, the five-time world champions gained a strange-hold on the region.

That sequence led to a problematic first-half of qualifying that saywthe Brazilians take a 4-1-6 record into Round 12.  To start their last third of qualifying, Brazil won their next five matches, earning early qualification with a run of wins over Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile.  The last four nations on that list: all of CONMEBOL's other World Cup qualifiers.

During that stretch, the Selecão posted sixteen goals against five allowed, turn-around results for an attack that was shut-out five times in their first eleven qualifiers.

While their attack struggled, the tactical discipline Dunga infused kept ten clean sheets in eighteen matches.  In five other matches, they held their opponents to one goal.  Of the three remaining results, two came in the last three rounds, after Brazil had locked up qualification.  While one of the best goalkeepers in the world, Júlio César (30, Internazionale, Italy), and center half Lucio (31, Internazionale) deserve credit for executing his plans, the shift to dominant defending and tactical responsibility is Dunga's building legacy.

If took Dunga that first year of qualification (specifically, the time after the 2008 Summer Olympics) to settle on a squad.  In formation, you see a base 4-4-2 that takes many forms (based on match-up, including at times morphing into a  4-5-1).  

In tactic, Dunga relies on Brazil's being the best counter-attacking side in the world - willing to play without the ball, use their deep-sitting midfielders and defense's strength to stand-up an attack and quickly, dynamically get into the counter.  This is why hear Brazil described as the most European team in South America.

This style has brought Dunga scrutiny from a futebol culture that cherishes their style of play.  This roar of criticism was so loud in early 2009 that Dunga was close to being dismissed.  One year later - after a dominant end of qualifying and a title at the Confederations Cup - Dunga is seen as one of the best international managers in the world, in large part because of his ability to take a team so married to a stylistic, flashy style and make them pragmatic.

Beyond Dunga's influence (an interesting out-growth of the type of player he was), there have been three key factors in Brazil's surge.

It took Kaká (27, M, Real Madrid, Spain) almost a year to return to 100 percent after May 2008 knee surgery.  While he returned early in the 2008-09 club season, the speed was not there.  In the fall of 2008, he was unable to burst away from defenders like he did pre-injury  Kaká did return to is normal self until the summer of 2009, when he showed himself fully healthy, particularly in dominating the second half of the Confederations Cup final.

There is also the emergence of Luis Fabiano as one of the best internationals in the world.  The striker perfectly fits Dunga's system: A player that can play as a lone striker or in a tandem, consistently making the right runs to open-up the opposing defences for Kaká and Robinho (25, F, Manchester City, England).  He lacks the flash of the classic Brazilian attackers, but there is a reliability to Fabiano.  Dunga knows exactly where he'll be, andwhat he'll do, and that fits the new Selecão perfectly.

Finally, Dunga has, for better or worse, settled on a team.  When you hear talk about the effects players like Ronaldinho (29, F, AC Milan, Italy), Pato (20, F, AC Milan), or Diego (24, M, Juventus, Italy) will have on the World Cup, you can almost dismiss it, for despite the world-class talent of all those players, Dunga has settled on others - players who better fit his tactics.  Those players include names like Luisão (28, D, Benfica, Portugal), André Santos (26, LW/LB, Fenerbahçe, Turkey), Elano (28, M, Galatasaray, Turkey), and Ramires (22, M, Benfica) - players you or I may not think amongst the most talented Brazilians, but players who are critical to making them World Cup favorites.

That favorite status is derived from their stylistic differences with Spain.  Brazil can play successfully with the ball or without, in a tightly-called or open match, whether they need to play physically or not.  In the winter of South Africa, the ability to win multiple ways could be a decisive difference.

Portugal - When Portugal was drawn in with Brazil, gasps went through the Cape Town crowd, and the "blogosphere" flooded Twitter with excitement.  When, moments later, it was remembered Cote d'Ivoire was in the same group, the "Group of Death" moniker was branded on the quartet.

If the entire Portugal side has quality commensurate with their marquee talent (Cristiano Ronaldo, 24, F/W, Real Madrid), this would be the tournament's toughest group, but the huge shadow cast by the game's greatest talent obscures three factors: a.) as we are reminded by sides like Sweden (on one end, centered around one elite talent) and Germany (on the other), one player has only so much an effect in this sport; b.) Carlos Queiroz has problems utilizing Ronaldo with the same success as Alex Ferguson and Manuel Pellegrini; c.) this is not your Selecçao of the Figo, Costa, of even Scolari.

These deficiencies were seen in qualifying.  In UEFA's Group 1, Portugal struggled to gain the playoff spot, showing an ineptness in attack that was remarkable given the presence of Ronaldo.  Against the non-Malta clubs of the group, Portugal managed only nine goals in eight matches.  Against the group's two other top finishers (Denmark and Sweden), Portugal got three goals in four matches, garnering only three points (0-1-3 record).

This ineptness is a function of their approach.  Under Carlos Queiroz (who took over for Luiz Felipe Scolari after Euro 2008), Portugal has lost all direction in attack.  Much like the French, their approach has indiscernible tactics beyond hoping that their talent can find a way to overcome.  In the last rounds of qualifying, a heroic, injury-risking performance from Ronaldo (setting-up the first goal in a key, 3-0 win in Round 8 versus Hungary while wrecking his ankle) exemplified their potential to overcome.  Against quality opposition like the Danes, such tactics did not work.

In the next six months, somebody is going to have to figure out how to use Ronaldo, but given failed coaching stints at Sporting CP (Portugal) and Real Madrid, it's unclear Queiroz is the man to do it.  His two stretches as assistant to Alex Ferguson at Manchester United (England) resurrected his reputation, but it is still nclear whether he is head-man material.

Like many of Ronaldo's coaches, Queiroz tends to give the talented attacker an entire flank, letting him have a free role on that side.  Often for Portugal, that side is the left.  The problem is that the Portuguese have no reliable means of attack through the middle or right despite talents like Jose Bosingwa (27, RB, Chelsea, England), Raul Meireles (26, M, FC Porto, Portugal), Deco (32, M, Chelsea), Simão (30, F/W, Atlético Madrid, Spain), Nani (23, W, Manchester United), and João Moutinho (23, M, Sporting CP).  For Portugal, it's a matter of tactics, not talent.

Should they find a way to get their attack producing, Portugal will be a threat in South Africa.  If they can overcome new-found obstacles at the back, Portugal can be one of the favorites.

The first of those obstacles is the long-term injury to Pepe (26, D, Real Madrid), who suffered a major knee injury last month.  If his timeline for recovery holds, he could be playing in the month before the World Cup.  Any set-backs, and Portugal's best defender is out.  Even if he returns, there will be questions about match fitness.

The Selecçao has depth in central defense thanks to Bruno Alves (28, FC Porto) and Ricardo Carvalho (31, Chelsea), but the veteran Chelsea back has had his troubles at club level.  If he can not regain the form that has made him the linch-pin of back lines for club and country, Portugal has little hope of handling the physicality of Drogba and Fabiano or the athleticism of Kaka, Robinho, and Kalou.

Cote d'Ivoire - Like Portugal, Les Éléphants' team tends to be overshadowed by the greatness of one player, so the structure of this preview will be similar to Portugal's:  look at the one player's effects, then talk about the rest of the side.  

What differentiates Cote d'Ivoire from Portugal is not (as some would expect) talent.  Cote d' Ivoire is an immensely talented side (as we'll discuss, below).  

What distinguishes them from Portugal are results: results from their star player; results from their team.

Starting with their star:

In a debate between Didier Drogba (31, F, Chelsea) and Fabiano as the best international striker of 2009, Drogba has the most dramatic argument. 

Before the fifth match of Africa's third round qualifying, the only thing that separated Cote d'Ivoire from having already  qualified was the possibility that Burkina Faso would turn around a huge goal differential disadvantage.  So coach Vahid Halihodzic started his best player and captain on the bench in Malawi, knowing one point would punch Les Éléphants' ticket to South Africa.  But when Malawi went up 1-0 in the 64th minute, Halihodzic brought out his best weapon.

Drogba scored a goal two minutes after being put in the match.  Cote d'Ivoire got their point and qualification for South Africa.

Though he has his detractors, when he's in-form Drogba is the most influential player in the world (if not the outright best).  Even when not on his game, he is still the game's best pure athlete, with the ultimate combination of size, strength, speed, skill and senses.  

Those traits made him the leading scorer in the last round of CAF qualifying, notching six goals in five matches.  Over his international career, Drogba is one of the most prolific strikers in the world, registering 41 goals in 60 matches.  

He is the player in the World Cup most able to win matches by himself, making Cote d'Ivoire a threat against any nation.

So good is Didier Drogba that even avid observers might miss the depth of their talent pool.  All of their key players are in Europe.  For the most part, they are playing major roles at key clubs in big leagues.  

While that kind of sentence has become cliché when evaluating national teams, it gives a good indication of the potential and talent of Cote d'Ivoire.

At forward, Drogba's consistent partner in Cote d'Ivoire's 4-4-2 has become Salomon Kalou (24,Chelsea), who has the benefit of having developed a club-level chemistry with his partner.  For depth, Cote d'Ivoire can offer the Konés (Bakari, 28, Marseille, France; Arouna, 26, Sevilla, Spain) and Aruna Dindane (29, Portsmouth/Lens), a player who has been a fixture for the team for a decade.

The midfield features on of the best holding midfielders in the world, Yaya Touré (26, FC Barcelona, Spain),  He is complemented in the middle by Didier Zokora (29, Sevilla), with club teammate Romaric (26) for depth.  The ball-winning capability of this midfield gives Cote d'Ivoire the ability to deal with highly-skilled sides. Touré's ability to get forward in Cote d'Ivoire's set-up gives him a more dynamic presence than he has for the Blaugrana.

On the wings, Halihodzic has come to employ Gervinho (22, Lille, France) - becoming one of the best attackers in France - and Abdul Kader Keita (28, Galatasaray), though if the coach should be more inclined toward a defensive option, natural defender Arthur Boka (26, Stuttgart, Germany) can be thrown into midfield.

The defense is led by Kolo Touré (28, Manchester City, England), who has been most frequently partnered by Abdoulaye Méïté (29, West Bromwich Albion, England), though it appears Sol Bamba (24, Hibernian, Scotland) may now have the inside-track on the spot in the starting XI.  Emmanuel Eboué (26, Arsenal, England) plays on the right, while Siaka Tiéné (27, Valenciennes, France) looks most likely to occupy the other side.

The defense will be key to protecting Boubacar Barry (30, KSC Lokeren, Belgium) in goal, a veteran keeper who is still relatively inexperienced at the international level.  Aside from a stretch with Stade Rennes early last decade, Barry has played his entire career below the top levels of club football, a statement that grows weaker with each day that the Jupiler League improves.

That is Cote d'Ivoire's only question.  The rest of their starting XI will have talent that rivals almost any side in the world.  But as we saw with Portugal's first Golden Generation, talent is not enough.  Whether the program has the experience or the players perform well with heightened expectations as reasonable questions that will explain the variance in predictions you will see for Cote d'Ivoire.

North Korea - The Korea DPR has only seven players outside of their domestic league, and with the lack of information flowing out of that nation, North Korea becomes the most difficult team to evaluate.  It's unclear how good their domestic league is, and as such, evaluating the level of their players comes with a sample-size issue.

Throughout these reviews, WSDigest has relied on a combination of international team results and individual player performances (for both club and country).  With North Korea, that tact is insufficient; yet, it is the only one available.

Let's first go over their qualifying results:

Korea DPR is the only one of AFC's four qualifiers that had to compete in the region's opening round of qualifying, blowing through Mongolia in the process.  In their round they were draw in with South Korea and finished second, going 3-3-0 and missing out on first by the goal differential tiebreaker.  They allowed no goals in six matches (though scored only four).

In the final round they again drew South Korea, again finished second in the group (and qualified), beating out Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the process -  three nations that have qualified for previous World Cups.  Going 3-3-2 in the final round of qualifying, their only losses  were in South Korea and Iran.  They allowed only five goals in eight matches, bringing their total allowed to seven in 16 matches.

Their player with the highest profile is Jong Tae-Se (25, F, Kawasaki Frontale, Japan), a Japanese-born South Korean who represents the DPR.  Acknowledged as one of the best players in Asia after a break-out performance in the 2008 East Asian Football Championships, he has drawn comparisons to Wayne Rooney in his style of play.  He typically plays along the line in Korea DPR's set-up, with a common tactic of the team to play it to Jong with his back to goal and create changes by making runs around him.  He has 12 goals in 20 international appearances, a scoring rate replicated in the J-League (41 goals in 106 appearances).

Given Korea DPR's defensive approach, Jong and Hong Yong-Jo (27, F, FC Rostov, Russia) carry a heavy burden.  Hong has a nearly-as-impressive international scoring rate (four goals in qualifying), though he has been unable to make the same impact in Russia as Jong has in Japan.  Hong captains the team, takes penalty kicks as well as most dead ball chances on goal, where he has exhibited world-class skill.  Like most of this teammates, he lacks elite physical abilities (relative to his World Cup competition) and has to compensate with his technical skill and ability to read the game.

Over the last half of qualifying, the North Koreans played most-often with six defenders in two lines of three.  Three central defenders played tight in the middle with one man in front of the line.  Two wing backs would provide back-side/far-post or pressure on the ball (if opposition was attacking on their flank), often creating a flat four in front of goal when play was on the opposite flank.  

Relying on positioning more than ability to close down their opponent, it was common to see the opposition with possession in-and-around the North Korean's area, trying to shoot through three or four defenders while also worrying about goaltender Ry Myong-Guk's (23, Pyongyang City, Korea DPR) position.  Described tactically, the North Koreans seem to readily sacrifice shape in favor of keeping men in front of the ball.

As a result, you rarely see a man behind the defense, and while you will see men unmarked in front of the last line, a defense that easily collapses can quickly get men between the ball and the line.  Their two midfielders are tasked with helping defender Pak Nam-Choi (24, April 25, Korea DPR, playing in the middle of the more advanced line of three) with closing down players in front of the last defenders.

To play against, it can be very frustrating, as the Korea DPR approach gives you the impression of being constantly close to breaking-through.  From a certain perspective, that's true, though the North Koreans have become so adapt at positioning themselves to block shots, it's a false perspective.

It is unlikely that this approach can continuously work well against a Fabiano or Drogba.  Likewise, against teams with higher skill levels (like, at the World Cup), they may be more apt to give up fouls and have to defend the set pieces that follow.  While they are very organized in defense on dead balls, lack of possession leading to more chances given-up could mean too many opportunities for Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire, and Portugal.

Worthless Predictions

June 15, Port Elizabeth: Cote d'Ivoire 2, Portugal 1 -  Les Éléphants use their best weapon, Drogba, to attack their  opposition's weakness in central defense.  Portugal defends very well, but they can't win the individual battles against the Ivorian.  Cote d'Ivoire has the athletes to stay with the Portuguese, and for a Selecçao side that did not play well in qualifying until they had their backs against the wall, this match lacks the urgency.

June 15, Johanessburg:  Brazil 4, North Korea 0 - Korea DPR is just out of their element, and they can't win the one-on-one battles against the Brazilians.  The Selecao use their size and physicality to overrun the North Koreans.  This is as lop-sided a match at we'll see in this year's tournament.

June 20, Johanessburg:  Brazil 2, Cote d'Ivoire 0 - Brazil has the defenders to contain Drogba, and with their two deep-sitting midfielders, they also have the support.  Cote d'Ivoire throws Drogba wide right to try and get him against André Santos, but Kalou is unable to score against Lucio and Luisão.  Brazil's wide-play is  able to avoid the strength in the middle of Cote d'Ivoire's defense, extending the back to set-up Fabiano on crosses.

June 21, Cape Town:  Portugal 1, North Korea 0 - Queiroz's side is frustrated throughout, and without tactical direction are unable to break through the DPR's defense.  They dominate possession, have tons of shots that are blocked are, from distance, are left wanting, but they can't break through.  Ultimately, after realizing a draw eliminates them, Portugal starts peppering the DPR with crosses towards Leidson and Ronaldo.  Eventually the Portugues break though, perhaps from a late Ronaldo direct kick.

June 25, Durban:  Brazil 3, Portugal 1 -  In a derby of sorts, Brazil is just too much for the Portuguese, where the opposite site of their disorganization in attack has them lose their shape and become exposed to Brazil's counter.  In  full stride after the tournament's first two machines, Dunga's machine is rolling, and although a late lapse gives away a goal, they are never threatened and go through on nine points.  Portugal bows out.

June 25, Nelspruit:  Cote d'Ivoire 2, North Korea 1 - While it takes them a while and they have to swallow their pride before they do it, eventually the Ivorians just start feeding Drogba.  After he eventually scores one in the air, and when DPR starts over-compensating for him, his runs off the ball are able to open the defense for a second.  North Korea gets a goal late for pride, as Cote d'Ivoire becomes lax and starts to celebrate advancement.  Ultimately, they win relatively comfortably and book their place in the Round of 16.